Is the book by North, Wallis and Weingast about economy or about history? This question is not diffi cult to answer. Every economist educated in Europe knows that the greatest economists were also good historians. They simply understood that people are familiar with recorded human history, so that the explanation of economic theories using historical examples had the biggest chance to be understood. Moreover, the greatest economists also knew that the interpretation of recorded human history is crucial for understanding of social phenomena and the misinterpretation of historical facts might have disastrous impact on the evolution of every society. North, Wallis and Weingast are certainly aware of these facts. As such they can be rightly considered as great economists.
Studying the human recorded history is always a challenging adventure. Explaining new theoretical concepts using historical examples is even more challenging. North, Wallis and Weingast try to provide an understanding of the nature of pressing problems like poverty and economic development with the use of an impressive method. They do not only stress the collection and interpretation of historical facts. Instead of formal logic, they simply use historical examples to explain their theoretical model. (p. 38) ." And, as was said above, in the natural states, the legal system is subordinated to the elites. To illuminate the meaning of the natural state the second chapter presents two historical examples. The fi rst is the example of the Aztec Empire and the second is the example of the Carolingian Empire. The Aztec Empire was ruled by the coalition of three ethnic groups living in the three city-states. The leaders were organized in the Council of Four. The Aztec Empire was interesting for its specifi c religion, which helped the ruling elites to maintain order via ideology of hierarchical structure, and for its educational system, which was training warrior skills, values, reading and also arts. As all natural states the Aztec Empire was also controlling trade. Both, the local agricultural production and privileged longdistance trade with luxury goods were under control of regulating and taxing by the state. Contrary to the Aztec empire, the Carolingian Empire was culturally different, nevertheless, it is characterized by similar organizational structure. After collapse of the Roman Empire in Europe the Catholic Church retained its infl uence. Later, in the year 800 when the Charlemagne was recognized as emperor, the pope broke political relationships with the Eastern emperor and became a part of the Carolingian Empire. The Carolingian Empire was ruled by the military occupying vassals. The long-distance trade was controlled by the privileged coalition of traders protected by the emperor. In alliance with the clergy Carolingians were regulating and taxing trade between monasteries and a few trade centers. The church was responsible for education, social welfare and the system of courts enforcing law through religion. Inner dynamics of the natural states and the reasons why they broke up is interestingly described further in the second chapter.
The third chapter applies to the natural state. In the natural state, the key requirement for extracting rents is the defi nition of property rights to the land. North, Wallis and Weingast describe how the land law evolved in England. They describe how the law was changed and how the court system enforcing property rights was structured. With the rise of "bastard feudalism" in England, the military enforcing the landlords' privileges created the atmosphere of violence.
The Especially interesting is their discussion of the role of the state in countries like Austria, Belgium, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands or the Scandinavian countries. The combination of a welfare state and market economy is qualifi ed by international market competition and impersonal application of rules constraining violence (p. 121). This might be an inspiration for the Czech Republic. Another interesting discussion stresses the importance of competition; not only market competition or political competition, but also competition in violence. The authors argue that when market competition ensures economic success and when political competition prevents rent creation, the open access order is more competitive in war.
The fi fth chapter is dedicated to the transition from the limited access order, the natural state, to the open access order. The question of transition is as follows: Why should the ruling elites extracting rents transform the limited access order into an open access order and lose thus their rents? Understandably, transition without the support of elites is impossible. North, Wallis and Weingast argue that even the elites face competition and in some historical and economical circumstances they must deal with inner confl icts and ruling agenda through impersonal relationships. Transition from personal to impersonal relationships in the ruling class is the fi rst step inciting the transition from the limited access order to the open access order.
Further in the chapter, North, Wallis and Weingast argue that the transition itself must fulfi ll three doorstep conditions to be successful. "DC#1. Rule of law for elites. DC#2. Perpetually lived organizations in the public and private spheres. DC#3. Consolidated control of the military" (p. 151). The rule of law means that the elites, even though the law does not threaten them as ordinary citizens, have open access to political power. This means that political power is distributed through the impersonal and transparent rules that are applied to every member of the ruling class equally and without manipulation. This, however, does not mean that the rule of law is completely established. The rules regulating impersonal relationships among members of the ruling class must be enforced via an independent court system, which is also able to protect citizens against the government. Both, ordinary citizens and members of the ruling class must have the same access to the enforcement of the law even though the law treats them differently. Interestingly, this does not mean that rules enforced by independent court system must be fair; only the access to the enforcement of the law must be opened. Doorstep condition #2, perpetually lived organizations in the public and private sphere, extends doorstep condition #1. To establish impersonal relationships between members of the ruling class and ordinary citizens, it is necessary to separate the organizational agenda from the ruler or the governor. Perpetually lived organizations are those, which are independent from the person of ruler or governor and fulfi ll their tasks even after the death of their architects. North, Wallis and Weingast explain and describe the separation of rulers and governors from perpetually lived organizations with the help of several historical examples. In my opinion, perpetually lived organizations are somewhat like impersonal bureaucracies in the sense of corporation. The doorstep condition #3, consolidated control of the military, is interesting. The question of the third doorstep condition is, however, how to transform the military from "exploiting the master to protecting the servant." "The big question is whether to kill the goose that lays golden eggs and eat the goose today, or pamper the goose and enjoy a fl ow of gold in the future" (p. 174). North, Wallis and Weingast argue that this question is solved by the ruling elites. When the ruling elites recognize that the revenues from trade are able to provide the military with more wealth than the exploitation of citizens' property, the third doorstep condition is fulfi lled. At that point the military must fall into the shade and conform to the control of citizens or independent ruling elites approving its activities and its purchases of the war equipment. This minimizes the risk that the military will be used against citizens. Without this rational decision considering the impact of use of military on the future economic development of the social organization the control of the military is impossible. Again, North, Wallis and Weingast explain and describe the transition of the military using very impressive historical examples.
In the sixth chapter the authors present again a range of very interesting historical examples. In this chapter the authors also demonstrate their deep insight into the history of Western civilization and general social science including social philosophy. In my opinion, the most interesting part is the presentation of democracy as an example of an evolving social experiment. The authors patiently demonstrate the forgotten truth that democracy is the type of organization that must be learned. Only brave and ideologically self-conscious elites were able to transform privileges into political rights and thus open the possibility to explore new and historically successful organizations. In this spirit, the authors suggest that democracy is not the end of the transition and therefore barriers to entry must be eliminated again. Even though we cannot know what will happen in the future, we must give the society a chance. The sixth chapter provides evidence that the authors might be considered to be the followers of Friedrich August von Hayek (i.e. 1991) and as the proponents of the discovery process and the process of creative destruction. They simply apply it to the endogenous evolution of political institutions.
In the seventh chapter the authors conclude their book clearly inspired by Schumpeter:
" These words summarize the contribution of the North's, Wallis' and Weingast's book. In my opinion, the central message of the book is the following. Open access order must be protected, because on the one hand it is successful in adaptation to the pressing problems of poverty and economic development and on the other hand it is vulnerable to transform into the limited access order. Open access order is not an exogenous social order; open access order is evolving and its adaptability makes it the most stable and durable kind of social order in the world. These are the reasons why we should extend what we have learned so far, and why we should suppress the violence. Social scientist thus should not answer the question how to create the open access order, but they should answer the question how to suppress violence.
What could be added? North's and Wallis' and Weingasts' book is well written, well structured and presents new explanations of some historical myths. Moreover, the book contains many sometimes old and conservative but patiently clarifi ed impressive insights. I heartily recommend this book to every proponent of new institutional economics, Austrian economics and more importantly to every economist concerned with economics of transition. Violence and Social Order contains important suggestions for public policy for countries in transition. However, Kohn (2009) criticizes the authors for laying too much stress on the Hobbesian nature of human behaviour. According to Kohn, the book treats the man more as a violent creature than a cooperative social being. This criticism thus demonstrates the character of the whole book, which according to Kohn lacks the detailed explanation of endogenous evolution of market institutions.
